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INTRODUCTION
In Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's earlier decision, 2 holding that the act of state doctrine did not
preclude judicial examination of Costa Rican currency control regula-
tions.3 While American banks with foreign loans outstanding will
applaud the Second Circuit's holding, a close scrutiny of the court's
reasoning reveals a decision at least partially flawed. The court's hold-
ing turned on its determination that the currency controls were not
wholly effective within Costa Rica.4 To make this determination, the
court adopted an inaccurate formula of debt situs incompatible with
the act of state doctrine's constitutional underpinnings.5 Further-
1. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
2. The district court held that the act of state doctrine barred judicial examination of
the Costa Rican currency controls. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g
granted, July 3, 1984. Subsequently, the court of appeals held that the Costa Rican cur-
rency controls should be given effect as being consistent with U.S. law and policy. The
court did not even reach the act of state doctrine. Allied, 757 F.2d at 519.
3. In 1981 the Costa Rican government imposed restrictions upon foreign exchange
transactions. One of these restrictions was to require approval by the Central Bank of
Costa Rica of any foreign exchange transaction on the part of Costa Rican banks. Subse-
quently, on August 27, 1981, the Central Bank's Board of Directors passed a resolution
prohibiting public sector entities from paying any interest or principal on debts to foreign
creditors denominated in foreign currency. On November 6, 1981, Costa Rica Executive
Decree 13103-H, which prevented any institution in Costa Rica from making payment on
an external debt without prior approval of the Central Bank in consultation with the Minis-
try of Finance, was published. Allied, 566 F. Supp. at 1442. In the instant case, the
regulations effectively prevented three Costa Rican banks from making payments to Allied,
a New York bank, on a past due debt of $4.5 million. Id. The three Costa Rican banks
were Banco Cartago, Banco Anglo, and Banco Nacional. Banco Cartago had a total
unpaid principal balance of about $3.8 million; Banco Anglo had a principal balance of
$500,000; and Banco Nacional had a principal balance of about $186,000. Id.
4. Allied, 757 F.2d at 521. The judiciary created the act of state doctrine to prevent
adjudication of a foreign sovereign's acts that occur wholly within that sovereign's terri-
tory. The Act states that "[s]ubject to § 429, courts in tfie United States will refrain from
examining the validity of an act of a foreign state taken in its sovereign capacity within the
state's own territory." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 428 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963) (defining the act of state doctrine's modern formulation).
In Allied, the court determined that the currency controls were not wholly effective within
Costa Rica by establishing the situs of the Costa Rican debts to be in New York. Allied,
757 F.2d at 521. The court was thus able to conclude that the currency controls affected
property outside the territorial boundaries of Costa Rica, and, consequently, were not effec-
tive acts of state.
5. The Allied court used place of payment to locate debt situs. Place of payment,
however, fails to accurately measure the effectiveness of a sovereign's actions within its
territory, since the court may thus judicially review a sovereign's act that is completely
effective within its territory. The separation of powers rationale of the act of state doctrine,
which maintains that the courts should refrain from offending a sovereign, is therefore
violated. See Comment, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine: A Proposal for a More
Flexible Standard, 49 ALB. L. REv. 647 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Debt Situs]; Com-
ment, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank
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more, the court's rigid debt situs theory conflicts with Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino's flexible decision-making approach.6
Despite these errors, the court reached the most appropriate reso-
lution of the Costa Rican defaults. The Costa Rican currency con-
trols, blocking payment on a valid and binding loan agreement,
violated fundamental contract principles and disrupted the normal
resolution of international debt problems.7 Recognition of the Costa
Rican currency controls as a legitimate act of state would have set
dangerous precedent and created a serious threat to the stability of
international commerce.8
Simply stated, the Allied court reached a sound result notwith-
standing a flawed application of the act of state doctrine. This incon-
gruity in the Allied decision should consequently focus attention on
the doctrine's impropriety in the specific context of foreign loan
defaults. In short, this Note concludes that the courts should not
allow the act of state doctrine to threaten those mechanisms and legal
principles designed to orderly resolve international debt problems. To
reach this conclusion, this Note first evaluates the act of state doc-
trine's theoretical basis and modern formulation. It then analyzes the
court's application of the act of state doctrine in Allied, as well as
surveys the Allied litigation as a whole. Finally, it considers the impro-
priety of the act of state doctrine in the context of international
finance.
I. BACKGROUND
A. COMITY, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Although the act of state doctrine constitutes the central concern
in Allied, the court also considered the related principles of comity and
sovereign immunity.9 A complete analysis of Allied therefore requires
Loans: A New Focusfor A Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1985) [hereinafter
Comment, A New Focus].
6. The Allied court's focus on the single criterion place of payment, for the application
of the act of state doctrine conflicts with the balancing approach advocated by the Supreme
Court. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398; see also Comment, Debt Situs, supra note 5.
7. Allied, 757 F.2d at 522.
8. In its amicus brief filed at the rehearing, the United States expressed concern that
recognition of the Costa Rican currency controls as a legitimate act of state would threaten
the certainty of international financial transactions. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 6-7, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1984), reh'g granted, July 3, 1984 [hereinafter Government Briefl.
9. There has been a significant amount of commentary that includes analysis of the
interrelationships of comity, sovereign immunity, and the act of state doctrine. See gener-
ally Lengel, The Duty of Federal Courts to Apply International Law: A Polemical Analysis
of the Act of State Doctrine, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 61; Zaitzeff & Kunz, The Act of State
Doctrine and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 449 (1985); Zimmerman, Applying an
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an explanation of all three interrelated principles.
1. Comity
The principle of comity is relevant to an analysis of Allied for two
reasons: (1) comity comprises part of the theoretical foundation of the
act of state doctrine;10 and (2) comity formed the basis for the court of
appeals' initial disposition of the Costa Rican currency controls. 1I
The principle of comity, as adopted by the court in the first Allied
hearing, does not lend itself to a single definition. Indeed, commenta-
tors define the principle in a number of different ways.12 For example,
at least one author asserts that comity is the respect nations must
accord one another, and that it therefore functions to preserve interna-
tional law.13
In Hilton v. Guyot,14 the Supreme Court adopted a more elabo-
rate definition of comity. The Court stated that comity is "neither a
matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will upon the other."' 15 According to the Court, comity
involves one nation's recognition of another nation's acts, "having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens."' 16
As an independent judicial doctrine, comity contains several
important limitations. 17 For example, comity is accorded to a foreign
act only where the laws and public policy of the forum state "and the
Amorphous Doctrine Wisely: The Viability of the Act of State Doctrine after the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547 (1983); Note, Adjudicating Acts of State
in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV.
722 (1983) [hereinafter, Note, Adjudicating Acts of State]; Comment, The Act of State Doc-
trine: A History of Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977);
Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 599 (1980); Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 103 (1982) [hereinafter Note, A Legislative Initiative].
10. See supra note 9.
11. Allied, 757 F.2d at 519.
12. See Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State: The Need for A
Commercial Act Exception to the Commercial Act Exception, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 763, 764(1983). The author quotes Brownie defining international comity as a species of accommo-
dation unrelated to, but distinguishable from, morality. He lists four other definitions of
comity cited by Brownlie. See id.; see also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 31 (3d ed. 1979).
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 765.
14. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
15. Id. at 163-64.
16. Id. at 164.
17. In Hilton, the Supreme Court made clear that comity is not an absolute require-
ment. The Court indicated that the recognition of another nation's laws is conditioned on
the judiciary's international duty and its regard for the rights of its own citizens. Id. at
163-64; see infra notes 18-19.
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rights of its residents are not violated." 18 Furthermore, comity cannot
be used to resolve conflicts between foreign and domestic laws "when
courts are forced to choose between a domestic law which is designed
to protect domestic interests, and a foreign law which is calculated to
thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order to protect for-
eign interests allegedly threatened by the objectives of domestic
law." 1
9
As mentioned, the principle of comity also comprises at least part
of the theoretical basis for the act of state doctrine.20 In Oeien v.
Central Leather Co.,21 the Supreme Court found that the doctrine's
initial articulation in Underhill v. Hernandez22 rested "upon the high-
est considerations of international comity and expediency."'23 Citing
Oetyen, scholars argue that one purpose of the act of state doctrine is
the preservation of international comity.24 By preventing inappropri-
ate judicial review of a foreign sovereign's actions, the act of state doc-
trine effectively recognizes those actions. The doctrine thus operates as
an extension of the principle of comity.
Yet the act of state doctrine differs from comity in several impor-
tant respects. 25 Perhaps the most important difference is that the act
of state doctrine will mandate the recognition of a foreign sovereign's
law.26 Comity, on the other hand, only allows for the voluntary recog-
nition of a foreign sovereign's law.27
2. Sovereign Immunity
If comity constitutes one part of the act of state doctrine's theo-
retical basis, sovereign immunity qualifies as another.28 Sovereign
immunity therefore provides further insight into the act of state doc-
trine. In addition, the district court in Allied directly addressed issues
of sovereign immunity. 29
18. Comfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.)
(citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
20. See supra note 9.
21. 246 U.S. 297 (1917) (applying the act of state doctrine to preserve international
comity in a Mexican expropriation case).
22. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
23. Oeten, 246 U.S. at 303-04. In Oetfen, the Court stated that "to permit the validity
of the acts of the sovereign to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of
another would very certainly imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex
the peace of nations." Id. at 304.
24. See Comment, supra note 12.
25. See Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 9, at 450-51.
26. Id. at 451.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 9.
29. The district court that first decided the Allied case held that the execution of the
Costa Rican promissory notes was a "commercial activity" within the meaning of the For-
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By definition, the principle of sovereign immunity "precludes [a]
litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against
a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless [the] sovereign
consents to suit."'30 The Supreme Court established this principle in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, a case in which the Supreme
Court granted immunity from seizure to vessels of a foreign national.31
According to the Court:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment
of that sovereignty to the same extent that power which could impose such
restriction.
32
In the context of foreign affairs, sovereign immunity prevents the
law of one country from infringing upon the rights of another coun-
try.33 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197634 (FSIA) cur-
rently defines the United States' understanding of international
sovereign immunity. FSIA codifies a restrictive theory of sovereignimmunity. Under this theory, a court may grant immunity for public
acts but not for private acts. 35 In simpler terms, FSIA generally
grants immunity subject to a number of statutory exceptions.36 The
most commonly used exceptions involve either a specific waiver of
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and therefore not entitled to per se protection under sover-
eign immunity. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp.
1440, 1443 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
31. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
32. Id. at 136.
33. See Comment, supra note 12, at 765 n.9. The author writes that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was viewed as a fundamental attribute of the foreign sovereign. Chal-
lenges to the concept of sovereign immunity were viewed as calling into question the right
of the foreign sovereign to exist. Id. at 765.
34. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982) [herein-
after FSIA].
35. The State Department adopted restrictive immunity in 1952 in the "Tate Letter."
The letter outlined the State Department's position adopting restrictive immunity. See C.
EBENROTH, BANKING ON THE ACT OF STATE: INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND THE ACT
OF STATE DOCTRINE 16 n.7 (1985).
36. FSIA clearly adopts the policy of restrictive immunity. Section 1602 states:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims
of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the
interests ofjustice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants
in United States courts. Under international law, states are not immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned
.... Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts
of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in
this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
Section 1604 states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at
the time of enactment of this Act, a foreign state shall be immune from jurisdiction
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immunity by the sovereign or some commercial activity on the part of
the sovereign. 37 With regard to the latter exception, immunity fails to
extend to a sovereign's commercial activity because, theoretically, the
activity represents a private act.
The act of state doctrine contains an exception that is, in some
respects, analogous to FSIA's "commercial exception." The Supreme
Court first developed this exception in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba.38 In Dunhill, the Court stated that the act of
state doctrine should not extend to the repudiation of a foreign sover-
eign's purely commercial obligation.39 The Court argued that the act
of state doctrine should not bar adjudication of commercial disputes.
Under the Court's rationale, adjudication of a commercial dispute
does not intrude into foreign policy matters because the foreign sover-
eign's actions are of a private nature.40
The existence of parallel exceptions in the act of state doctrine
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity comes as no surprise. Admit-
tedly, sovereign immunity under FSIA is a legal principle independent
of the act of state doctrine. Yet it also functions as part of the act of
state doctrine's theoretical substratum.41 In Underhill v. Hernandez,42
the first U.S. articulation of the act of state doctrine, sovereign immu-
nity formed the Supreme Court's critical concern. In Underhill, the
Court held that the tortious acts of a Venezuelan revolutionary gov-
ernment, committed against an American citizen in Venezuela, were
"not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another gov-
ernment."'43 Emphasizing the sovereignty issue, Chief Justice Fuller
wrote:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign State and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections
1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id. § 1604 (1982).
37. Statutory exceptions include waiver of immunity by the foreign state, explicitly or
by implication; commercial activities; appropriation of property in violation of interna-
tional law; disputes over immovable property situated in the United States; and certain
actions for personal injury or death. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982). The statute also limits the
liability of foreign states. Id. § 1606.
Foreign states are not immune from counterclaims arising from "the same transaction or
occurence" that is the subject matter of a claim initiated in United States courts by the
foreign state. Id. § 1607.
38. 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (only four Justices in Dunhill approved the existence of a
"commercial exception" to the act of state doctrine).
39. Id. at 695.
40. Id. at 697-99.
41. See Note, Adjudicating Acts of State, supra note 9, at 723. The author writes: "The
act of state doctrine developed as a corollary to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
then assumed a life of its own." Id. See generally supra note 9.
42. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
43. Id. at 254.
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of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of griev-
ances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
44
Despite the overlap, sovereign immunity, as codified by the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, differs significantly from the act of
state doctrine.45 The principal difference lies in the doctrines' diver-
gent applications. A court applies sovereign immunity at the jurisdic-
tional level.46 If the court finds that a foreign sovereign enjoysimmunity, it will dismiss the suit for want of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.47 By contrast, the act of state doctrine only applies to the merits
of a case.48 For example, a foreign sovereign would not use the act of
state doctrine to defeat jurisdiction. Rather, the sovereign would
invoke the act of state doctrine as a complete defense of its actions.49
Difficulties still arise where sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine overlap. Much of the trouble stems from Dunhill'sso
recognition of a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine.51
The Dunhill exception fails to work in tandem with FSIA's commer-
cial exception. 52 For example, a court, such as the district court in
44. Id. at 252.
45. See generally C. EBENROTH, supra note 35. Ebenroth provides a good treatment
of the act of state doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
46. FSIA, supra note 34, § 1604. Section 1604 specifically provides for the immunity
of a foreign state from jurisdiction. See also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. See Frankel v. Banco Nacionel de Mexico, No. 82 Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31,
1983). Frankel involved Mexican currency controls. The court ultimately determined that
the currency controls were governmental acts and not commercial acts, and that sovereign
immunity barred adjudication. The court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. See also C. EBENROTH, supra note 35, at 31-38.
48. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rehg granted, July 3, 1984. The district
court granted subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the litigation fell within the
commercial activities exception of FSIA. However, the court denied the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment on the theory that the act of state doctrine constituted a legitimate
defense. The Costa Rican banks had challenged subject matter jurisdiction by asserting
sovereign immunity; alternatively, they raised the defense of the act of state doctrine. The
court stated: "[T]he defense of the act of state doctrine is a meritorious one and in view
thereof Allied's motion for summary judgment must be denied." Id. at 1442.
49. Id. A finding that the act of state doctrine is applicable would confer presumptive
validity on the foreign sovereign's actions. The court in Allied stated, "The act of state
doctrine operates to confer presumptive validity on certain acts of a foreign sovereign by
rendering non-justiciable claims that challenge such acts. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Cred-
ito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985).
50. Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
51. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. See generally McCormick, The
Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doc-
trine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477 (1984); Note, International Association of Machin-
ists v. OPEC: The Ninth Circuit Breathes New Life into the Act of State Doctrine in
Commercial Settings, 16 Gno. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 427 (1982); Comment, IAM v.
OPEP: Commercial Activity--One Factor in a Balancing Approach to the Act of State Doc-
trine, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 215 (1982).
52. See C. EBENROTH, supra note 35, at 26-38.
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Allied, may conclude that a sovereign's action (e.g., the execution of a
promissory note) constitutes a commercial activity beyond the protec-
tion of sovereign immunity. 3 Yet a court may further conclude that
subsequent actions taken by the sovereign (e.g., currency controls) do
not constitute a commercial activity and consequently are nonreview-
able as acts of state.54 The two actions are separate and discrete; yet,
they inhere to a common commercial transaction and therefore are
closely interrelated. Logic and consistency of decision would seem-
ingly compel the court's recognition of a commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine when the court recognizes a commercial exception
to sovereign immunity. Otherwise, as Allied illustrates, the act of state
doctrine undercuts its closely related counterpart, sovereign immu-
nity, because the court grants jurisdiction only to deny relief.
3. The Act of State Doctrine
The earliest articulation of the act of state doctrine stemmed from
considerations of sovereign immunity and comity.55 Subsequent case
law continued to emphasize both legal principles. 56 The law also rec-
ognized "conflict of laws principles" as a third element in the act of
state doctrine's theoretical framework.5 7 Until the 1964 decision,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, sovereign immunity, comity,
53. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1443
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g granted, July 3, 1984.
54. Id. at 1443-44.
55. See supra notes 9, 21-23, 42-44 and accompanying text.
56. C. EBENROTH, supra note 35, at 18.
57. Id. The Supreme Court clearly delineated the act of state doctrine as a "special
conflict of laws rule" in the Mexican expropriation case, Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). The Supreme Court recognized, at an early stage, that the act of
state doctrine operates as a mandatory choice of law or "super-conflict of laws" rule that
modifies ordinary conflict rules including comity, when the conduct of a foreign sovereign
is at issue. Under such circumstances, the act of state doctrine requires a United States
court to select the law of the sovereign whose actions are at issue and confer on those
actions a presumptive validity over that sovereign's law. The court cannot decline applica-
tion of the sovereign's law on the grounds that it is repugnant to domestic public policy.
See Note, A Legislative Initiative, supra note 9, at 107; see also Collinson, Sabbatino: The
Treatment of International Law in United States Courts, 3 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 27
(1964); Gilbert & Bradford, The Act of State Doctrine: Dunhill and Other Sabbatino Prog-
eny, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Henldn, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice of Law,
44 U. COLO. L. Rav. 173 (1972); Leigh & Sandler, Dunhill: Toward A Reconsideration of
Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685 (1976). Henkin writes:
Act of state is a special rule modifying the ordinary rules of conflict of laws. If
there were no act of state doctrinea domestic court in a case like Sabbatino would
decide it on "conflicts" principles. It would first decide what law "governed" the
issues. If under accepted choice of law principles the foreign law should govern,
the court could still refuse to apply that law if it were found to be contrary to the
public policy of the forum. The act of state doctrine, however, says that the for-
eign "law"(i.e. the act of state) must govern ....
Henkin, supra at 178.
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and conflict of laws principles formed the theoretical basis for the act
of state doctrine. 58 In Sabbatino, however, the Supreme Court refor-
mulated the act of state doctrine, giving the doctrine "constitutional"
underpinnings.5 9
Sabbatino, like the majority of act of state decisions at the time,
involved foreign expropriation of American property. 60 The defend-
ant, an American commodity broker, contracted with a Cuban corpo-
ration, largely owned by American investors, to buy Cuban sugar. In
response to U.S. reduction of the Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban gov-
ernment expropriated the corporation's property and rights. The
Cuban government permitted the ship carrying the sugar to leave
Cuban waters only after the broker entered into a new contract with a
bank, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. Upon delivery of
the sugar, the broker accepted the bills of lading, received payment for
the sugar from its customer, and then refused to deliver the proceeds
to the Cuban agent. The Cuban instrumentality subsequently insti-
tuted an action to recover the proceeds. The district court granted
summary judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that the Cuban
expropriation decree violated international law. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 61
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of state doc-
trine barred judicial scrutiny of the Cuban expropriation decree. The
Court concluded:
[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and an all encompassing
rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law.6
2
Critics have exhaustively examined the Court's holding above. 63
This Note focuses on four areas of particular interest:64 (1) the
Court's theoretical justification for the act of state doctrine; (2) its
analysis of the act of state doctrine and international law; (3) its
emphasis on a flexible case-by-case approach to the act of state doc-
trine; and (4) its specific inclusion of a territorial limitation to the act
of state doctrine.
58. See supra notes 9, 21-23, 41-44, 57 and accompanying text.
59. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1963).
60. Id. at 403.
61. Id. at 401-08.
62. Id. at 428.
63. See supra notes 5, 9, 35, 51.
64. The complexity of the Court's opinion offers innumerable lines of analysis. Such
analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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a. The Act of State Doctrine's Theoretical Justification
Sabbatino is most significant for its reformulation of the act of
state doctrine's theoretical basis.65 While recognizing "historic
notions of sovereign authority" as the accepted rationale for the act of
state doctrine, the Court in Sabbatino concluded that these notions
"do not dictate its existence."'66 Instead, the Court grounded the act of
state doctrine squarely in the constitutional theory of separation of
powers. 67
According to the Court in Sabbatino, the fundamental purpose of
the act of state doctrine is to preserve the separation of power between
the judiciary and executive in the area of international relations:
The act of state doctrine. ... arises out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers.
... its continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribu-
tion of functions between the judicial and political branches of government on
matters bearing on foreign affairs.
68
Ideally, proper application of the act of state doctrine limits the judici-
ary's role in international matters. Arguably, this is the case when a
United States court declines to review the actions of a foreign sover-
eign effective within the sovereign's territory.
A careful analysis of Sabbatino reveals three closely intertwined
reasons for limiting judicial review under such circumstances:
(1) judicial review would offend the foreign nation; (2) judicial review
would consequently interfere with executive efforts to resolve the dis-
pute; and (3) judicial review, in any event, would not lead to practical
relief for the plaintiff. Stated simply, a court runs the risk of offending
a foreign sovereign when it passes judgment on acts of the sovereign
that are effective within its territory. The court's judgment could com-
plicate executive involvement and lead to the disruption of diplomatic
relations.
Judicial intrusion of this kind into foreign affairs is antithetical to
the courts' traditional position. As one commentator noted, "[Slince
the 1930's, the judiciary in this country has consistently held that the
conduct of foreign policy is vested solely in the executive branch."' 69
This position is explicitly echoed in Sabbatino: "If the political
65. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 423.
68. Id. at 423, 427-28.
69. Lengel, supra note 9, at 91.
Chief Justice John Marshall, while a member of the House of Representatives,
said, "The President is the sole Organ of the nation in its external relations and its
sole representative with foreign nations." This position, prevalent in Justice
Harlan's opinion in Sabbatino, is followed by the Court today.
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branches are unwilling to exercise their ample powers to effect com-
pensation, this reflects a judgment of the national interest which the
judiciary would be ill advised to undermine indirectly. '70
The Court in Sabbatino further emphasized the impropriety of
judicial involvement when an effective taking by a foreign sovereign
precludes the court's ability to grant practical relief.71 By precluding
judicial review under such circumstances, the act of state doctrine
saves the court the time and trouble of reaching a decision that has no
practical value.
Unfortunately, the Allied court's application of the act of state
doctrine does not square with the doctrine's constitutional underpin-
nings. The Allied formulation of debt situs does not effectuate the act
state doctrine's separation of powers rationale.
b. The Act of State Doctrine and International Law
The court in Sabbatino concluded that the act of state doctrine
should delimit the proper roles of the judiciary and executive in inter-
national relations. In doing so, the Supreme Court diminished with-
out eliminating the judiciary's power to adjudicate international
disputes. The Court in Sabbatino explained "that the greater degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international
law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an
agreed principle to circumstances of fact .... - 72 The Court's holding
also indicated that United States courts are to apply international law
of a sufficiently specific nature, i.e., "a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles. '73 The Court quali-
fied this position, though, noting that "customary international law" is
not dispositive.74
70. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436. "Piecemeal dispositions of this sort involving the
probability of affront to another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being car-
ried on by the Executive Branch and might prevent or render less favorable the terms of an
agreement that could otherwise be reached." Id. at 432.
71. Id. at 435. The Court stated, "When one considers the variety of means possessed
by this country to make secure foreign investment, the persuasive or coercive effect ofjudi-
cial invalidation of acts of expropriation dwindles in comparison." Id.
72. Id. at 428.
73. Id.
74. See id. The Court states that the act of state doctrine may bar judicial inquiry into
the validity of a taking effective within a foreign sovereign's territory "even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates customary international law." Id.
In a strong dissent, Justice White took issue with the majority's remarks on customary
international law. Arguing from case law and general policy, White held that the act of
state doctrine should not preclude judicial review of a foreign state's actions when there has
been a clear violation of international law. See id. at 439-72. Congress likewise took issue
with the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply customary international law. See Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009 (1964) (current
version at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976) (amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)).
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The Court's willingness to apply "hard" international law relies
on the premise that the presence of such law eliminates the risk that
the judiciary will offend a foreign sovereign and consequently become
entangled in foreign affairs. Where hard international law exists, a
foreign sovereign in violation of that law would have little or no expec-
tation that its actions could evade judicial condemnation. Clearly
delineated rules of international law would put the sovereign on notice
that its actions could not escape judicial scrutiny.
c. The Act of State Doctrine and Flexibility of Decision Making
Application of the act of state doctrine involves an intricate bal-
ancing process.75 A court must determine whether and to what extent
judicial review of a foreign sovereign's actions will harm United States
foreign policy. 76 As the Supreme Court implied in Sabbatino, such a
determination will necessarily vary from case to case: "It is also evi-
dent that some aspects of international law touch more sharply on
national nerves than do others; the less important the implications of
an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for
exclusivity in the political branches."'77 Against this duty to refrain
from setting foreign policy, a court must weigh its apparent duty to
apply controlling principles of international law,78 determining in turn
whether the codification of that law is sufficient to compel its
application. 79
As the Supreme Court concluded in Sabbatino, a case-by-case
approach best accomplishes this balancing process.80 Failure to adopt
In the "Hickenlooper Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Congress pro-
posed to "reverse in part the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Banco National de
Cuba v. Sabbatino." See S. REP. No. 1188, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3829, 3852. The Amendment's statement of purpose
claims that its effect is "to achieve a reversal of presumptions." The statement continues:
Under the Sabbatino decision, the courts would presume that any adjudication as
to the lawfulness under international law of the act of a foreign state would embar-
rass the conduct of foreign policy unless the President says it would not. Under
the amendment, the Court would presume that it may proceed with an adjudica-
tion... unless the President states officially that such an adjudication.., would
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy.
Id. The Hickenlooper Amendment has been narrowed by subsequent judicial decisions.
See French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 22 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394
(2d Cir.) remanded 400 U.S. 1019 (1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
75. See Comment, Debt Situs, supra note 5; Comment, A New Focus, supra note 5; see
also infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 428, 439-72. See generally Lengel, supra note 9.
79. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
80. The careful weighing of factors inherent to an act of state analysis necessitates a
substantial amount of judicial discretion. The only method whereby the courts can fully
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a flexible approach prevents a court from adequately considering the
unique circumstances that inhere to each act of state situation. A
straightforward rule of decision forecloses the careful weighing of fac-
tors necessary to determine whether a foreign sovereign's conduct con-
stitutes an act of state. For example, reliance on a rigid rule of
decision would prevent a court from completely assessing all the ele-
ments that bear on the effectiveness of a sovereign's actions within its
territory. Similarly, a court would be unable to accurately determine
whether and to what extent adjudication of the conduct in question
would harm foreign relations. A court could not even determine
whether available principles of international law were sufficiently clear
to allow adjudication to proceed.
Recognizing the value of a flexible approach, the Supreme Court
expressly refused to formulate the act of state doctrine as a hard and
fast rule of decision. It explicitly rejected the option of "laying down
or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule."8 In contrast,
the Allied court's adoption of a rigid theory of debt situs sharply con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's desire for flexibility of decision making
in act of state cases. 82
d. The Act of State Doctrine's Territorial Limitation
Sabbatino expressly recognized a territorial limitation to the act
of state doctrine. According to Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine
bars judicial examination of a "taking of property within its own terri-
tory by a foreign sovereign government .... ,,8 3 Conversely, the act of
state doctrine does not bar judicial examination of a taking of property
that occurs, or is substantially effective, outside the sovereign's terri-
tory. Thus, the act of state doctrine only applies to acts effective within
the sovereign's territory.
A Second Circuit decision, Republic of Iraq v. First National City
Bank,84 illustrates this territorial limitation. In Republic of Iraq, both
the district court and the court of appeals refused to apply the act of
employ this discretion is through the careful evaluation of the circumstances unique to each
alleged act of state.
81. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
82. The Allied court's use of debt situs can only be properly understood in the context
of territorial limitation to the act of state doctrine, which confines the application of the
doctrine to those acts of a foreign sovereign effective within its territory. In those cases
involving intangible assets, the situs of the debt triggers this limitation. That is, where a
debt is located determines whether or not the territorial limitation will preclude application
of the act of state doctrine. If a debt is located outside the foreign sovereign's territory, the
territorial limitation would prevent application of the act of state doctrine: the sovereign's
"taking" of the debt is an action effective only outside the sovereign's territory. See infra
notes 83-106 and accompanying text.
83. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
84. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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state doctrine to certain Iraqi ordinances.85 The ordinances purported
to confiscate the U.S. bank accounts of the deceased Iraqi monarch,
King Faisal.8 6 The court of appeals reasoned that the act of state doc-
trine did not apply to the ordinances because the affected property lay
outside Iraqi borders.87 After holding that the act of state doctrine did
not preclude examination of such extraterritorial takings, the court of
appeals concluded that the ordinances were contrary to United States
law and policy and should therefore be denied effect. 88
The court of appeals thus engaged in a three-step analysis, which
it also followed in Allied.89 The court asked three questions:
(1) whether the taking, the act of the foreign sovereign, was effective
within its territory; (2) whether the act of state doctrine consequently
precluded judicial review; and (3) if the taking was not effective,
whether comity recognized it as consistent with United States law and
policy.
While this analysis works easily with tangible assets, it is difficult
to apply to a taking of intangible assets. A debt, for example, has no
physical attributes that can give it an obvious concrete situs.90 Rather,
a debt's situs is a function of whatever theory of debt situs the court
employs. Lack of a concrete situs complicates the determination of
whether a purported seizure of a debt is effective within a sovereign's
territory.91 If the court decides the situs is within the sovereign's terri-
tory, the sovereign's "taking" is effective and the act of state doctrine
precludes judicial review. On the other hand, if the court locates the
situs of the debt outside the sovereign's territory, the sovereign's "tak-
ing" has extraterritorial effect and the act of state doctrine cannot
apply. With regard to intangible assets, application of the act of state
doctrine thus hinges on tenuous and malleable determinations of debt
situs.
For act of state debt situs analysis, the Second Circuit has gener-
ally applied the rule of Harris v. Balk:92 the situs of a debt depends on
85. Id. at 50-51.
86. Id. at 49-50.
87. Id. at 51.
88. Id.
89. In the Allied rehearing, the court of appeals determined first whether the act of
state doctrine precluded judicial examination of the Costa Rican currency controls. The
court next determined whether those controls were consistent with United States law and
policy, holding that they were not. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
90. See Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968) (The court states: "The situs of intangible
property is about as intangible a concept as is known to the law.").
91. See generally Comment, Debt Situs, supra note 5; Comment, A New Focus, supra
note 5.
92. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
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jurisdiction over the debtor.93 Menendez v. Saks and Co. 94 was the
first case to expressly rely on the Harris rule. In Menendez, the own-
ers of expropriated Cuban cigar companies sought to recover pay-
ments from United States importers for shipments of Cuban cigars. 95
The Cuban government intervened for the purpose of confiscating the
accounts receivable. 96 Relying on Harris, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the confiscation of the accounts receivable was inef-
fective and did not constitute an act of state since the situs of the obli-
gation remained with the importers in the United States. 97 The court
stated, "For purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not located
within a foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or
collect it."'98
In contrast, a Fifth Circuit decision, Tabacalera Severiano Jorge
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co. ,99 treated the issue of debt situs in a manner
more consistent with the act of state doctrine's separation of powers
rationale. In Tabacalera, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Cuban government's efforts to acquire a debt owed to a Cuban
corporation were not entitled to protection by the act of state doc-
trine.10° Rather than allow esoteric notions of situs to cloud the cru-
cial determination of the effectiveness of the sovereign's actions within
its territory, the court simply used a common sense analysis of the
effectiveness of the sovereign's actions:
[W]hen a foreign government performs an act of state which is an accom-
plished fact, that is when it has the parties and the res before it and acts in such
a manner as to change the relationship between the parties touching the res, it
would be an affront to such foreign government for courts of the United States
to hold that such act was a nullity. 10 1
93. In Harris, a creditor in Maryland was allowed to garnish a debt owed by a North
Carolina resident temporarily in Maryland to a second creditor, who was also a resident of
North Carolina. The Supreme Court noted that a debt is intangible, and that the real sub-ject of attachment is the obligation to pay the debt. The obligation of a debtor to pay his
debt thus remains unchanged by the movement of the debtor from state to state; therefore,
the debt may be enforced wherever the creditor is able to serve process on the debtor. See
Harris, 198 U.S. at 216-17, 222-23. Although another aspect of Harris has been overruled,
see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the debt situs holding remains intact.
94. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
95. Menendez, 485 F.2d at 1361.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1354-65.
98. Id. at 1365. See also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854,
862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l
Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
735 F.2d 645, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that (1) actions of the Cuban government did
not accomplish cancellation of the bank's debt, and (2) the act of state doctrine was not
applicable in the action).
99. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
100. Id. at 716.
101. Id. at 715.
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Under the Fifth Circuit approach, a court's particular theory of
act of state debt situs must remain consistent with a common sense
evaluation of the effectiveness of the sovereign's actions.10 2 A court
should not adopt a theory of situs that defeats a sovereign's reasonable
expectations of dominion over the seized debt.103 Judicial reliance on
a debt situs theory that does not accurately measure either the effec-
tiveness of a sovereign's taking or the reasonableness of the sovereign's
expectations only leads to the court's intrusion into foreign affairs. 1 4
This result is at odds with the act of state doctrine's separation of
powers rationale.10 5
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Allied intended
to implement the Tabacalera "common sense approach," 10 6 the
court's theory of debt situs failed to accurately measure the effective-
ness of Costa Rica's actions. Stated more broadly, the court's focus on
a single determinative criterion, place of payment,10 7 did not allow for
a complete evaluation of those factors logically bearing on the issue of
the effectiveness of Costa Rica's actions.
B. ALLIED BANK INTL. V. BANCO CREDITO AGRICOLA DE CARTAGO
The Allied litigation developed when three Costa Rican banks,
wholly owned by the Republic of Costa Rica and subject to direct
control by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, defaulted on promissory
notes issued by a U.S. banking syndicate for which Allied Bank was
the agent.10 8 A four and one-half million dollar balance remained on
the notes at the time of default. 10 9 The notes were payable in New
York in U.S. dollars. 110
The banks' defaults were due solely to the Costa Rican govern-
ment's actions.111 In July 1981, in response to escalating national eco-
102. See id.; Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d at 894.
103. See generally Comment, Debt Situs, supra note 5; Comment, A New Focus, supra
note 5.
104. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco National de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 884
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court states:
The underlying notion embodied in the territorial limitation is the considered judg-
ment of the judicial branch that courts will vex our relations with foreign govern-
ments only when they act to frustrate the foreign nation's reasonable expectations
of dominion. On the other hand, a foreign nation cannot be said to entertain rea-
sonable expectations of dominion over property located in this nation at the time of
the attempted confiscation.
Id
105. Id.; see supra note 5.
106. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 518-19.
109. See supra note 3.
110. Allied, 757 F.2d at 519.
111. Id.
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nomic problems, Central Bank issued regulations that essentially
suspended all external payments, and in November 1981, the govern-
ment issued an executive decree that conditioned all payments of
external debt on express approval from Central Bank. Central Bank
subsequently refused to authorize any foreign debt payments in U.S.
dollars, thereby precluding payment on the Allied notes at issue.1 2 In
accordance with the provisions of the agreement, Allied accelerated
the debt and sued the defaulting banks for the amount of principal and
income outstanding.1 13
The district court in Allied held that: (1) the execution of the
promissory notes was a "commercial activity" within the meaning of
FSIA and therefore not per se entitled to protection under sovereignimmunity, but (2) where the acts of the Central Bank of Costa Rica,
the President, and Finance Minister were acts of state (i.e., acts
designed to serve a public, not commercial function), the act of state
doctrine would preclude adjudication of the suit.1 14 The court cor-
rectly distinguished those acts that implicated the jurisdictional con-
cerns of FSIA (the execution of the notes) from those acts that
implicated the act of state doctrine (the Costa Rican currency con-
trols). The court made no effort, however, to coordinate the act of
state doctrine with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act."15 As men-
tioned previously, failure to recognize a commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine when an exception is granted under FSIA argu-
ably undercuts the effect of FSIA.116 Under such an approach, a court
grants jurisdiction only to deny relief. Finally, the district court did
not even consider whether the Costa Rican currency controls were
extraterritorial in effect, and therefore beyond the scope of the act of
state doctrine.' 17
The decision of the court of appeals, in its first hearing of Allied,
contained more flaws than the decision of the district court. The court
of appeals failed to apply the act of state doctrine"1 " and erroneously
concluded that comity compelled recognition of the Costa Rican cur-
rency controls as valid law. 119
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g granted, July 3, 1984.
115. Id. at 1443 n.2. "There is an obvious area of overlap between the 'commercial
activity' question under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and certain of the consider-
ations here described in connection with the act of state doctrine." Id.
116. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
117. Allied, 566 F. Supp. at 1443.
118. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985).
119. Id.
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The court of appeals' error consisted of two parts: (1) concluding
that comity would compel recognition of the Costa Rican controls and
(2) concluding that the controls were consistent with United States
law and policy. The application of comity is voluntary; 120 comity can-
not be used when its application would violate the rights of the resi-
dents of the forum state. 121 The court of appeals did not consider the
detrimental effects that recognition of the currency controls would
have on the U.S. bank, Allied. The court should have denied the con-
trols comity to protect the contractual rights of Allied, a resident of
the forum state. 122 Furthermore, the court's conclusion that the cur-
rency controls were consistent with United States law and policy was
simply incorrect.1 23 Indeed, an amicus brief filed by the United States
for the rehearing flatly declared that the Costa Rican currency con-
trols were not consistent with United States policy: "The Court's
opinion was apparently based upon an incorrect view that the applica-
tion of Costa Rican law to prevent enforcement of appellant's con-
tract, where Costa Rican law would otherwise not be applicable, was
consistent with United States policies and was required by comity."1 24
In the rehearing, the court of appeals reversed its earlier finding
that the Costa Rican currency controls were consistent with United
States policy.125 The court held that the Costa Rican government's
unilateral attempt to repudiate private commerical obligations was
inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt problems
and contrary to the interests of the United States, a major source of
private, international credit. The court concluded that recognition of
the Costa Rican directives would run counter to principles of contract
law. 126
Before reaching the issue of the currency controls' consistency
with United States policy, the court of appeals correctly considered
whether the act of state doctrine even permitted judicial evaluation of
the controls. 127 Reversing the decision of the district court, the court
120. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
123. See Government Brief, supra note 8.
A major weakness in the court's decision was its reliance on a one-hundred-year-old
bankruptcy case, Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883), to inter-
pret United States law and policy. The court attempted to draw an analogy between an
action in bankruptcy and the Costa Rican currency regulations. C. EBENROTH, supra note
35, at 53. The analogy fails for a number of reasons. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant on
Rehearing at 22, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d. 23 (2d.
Cir. 1984), reh'g granted, July 3, 1984. [hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief].
124. See Government Brief, supra note 8, at 2.
125. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.
1985).
126. Id. at 522.
127. Id.
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of appeals ultimately held that the act of state doctrine did not pre-
clude judicial evaluation of the Costa Rican currency controls.1 28 The
court made this determination by locating the situs of the Costa Rican
debt in New York. 129 In so doing the court was able to conclude that
the currency controls were not effective within Costa Rican territory
and therefore not within the scope of the act of state doctrine.1 30
The court arrived at New York as the situs of the Costa Rican
debt through two separate concepts of debt situs: (1) an "act of state
debt situs analysis," and (2) an "ordinary debt situs analysis.' 31 The
court based its act of state debt situs analysis on the common sense
approach of Tabacalera.132 In considering whether Costa Rica had
effectively altered the relationship between debtor and creditor, the
court, however, departed from Tabacalera and focused instead on a
single criterion, place of payment of the debt obligation. 133 The court
concluded that the currency controls were ineffective in Costa Rica
because they "could not wholly extinguish the Costa Rican banks'
obligation to timely pay United States dollars to Allied in New
York." 134 Under this debt situs analysis, the court merely located
place of payment to determine the applicability of the act of state doc-
trine. Because the place of payment was not within the foreign sover-
eign's territory, the court considered its purported taking ineffective,
i.e., the debt situs was outside the sovereign's territory and the act of
state doctrine inapplicable.
In addition to its "act of state debt situs analysis," the court
applied an "ordinary debt situs analysis."' 135 Factored into this analy-
sis were a number of considerations: "The Costa Rican banks con-
ceded jurisdiction in New York and they agreed to pay the debt in
New York City in United States dollars. Allied, the designated syndi-
cate agent, is located in the United States ... [and] some of the negoti-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 521-22.
130. Id.
The court writes:
The extraterritorial limitation (of the act of state doctrine) ... dictates that our
decision herein depend on the situs of the property at the time of the purported
taking. The property, of course, is Allied's right to receive repayment from the
Costa Rican banks in accordance with the agreements. The act of state doctrine is
applicable to this dispute only if, when the decrees were promulgated, the situs of
the debts was in Costa Rica. Because we conclude that the situs of the property
was in the United States, the doctrine is not applicable.
Id. at 521 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 521-522.
132. Id. at 521.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 521-22.
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ations between the parties took place in the United States." 136 The
court further focused on the U.S. interest in the litigation of maintain-
ing New York's status as one of the foremost commercial centers in
the world. The court also noted that "[t]he United States has an inter-
est in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in the United States
...under contracts subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
courts may assume... their rights will be determined in accordance
with recognized principles of contract law."' 1
37
In sum, the court located Costa Rica's debt in New York under
both debt situs analyses; consequently, it concluded that the act of
state doctrine did not bar judicial examination of the currency con-
trols.138 After making this necessary determination, the court contin-
ued its comity analysis and denied the effect of the controls, finding
them contrary to United States law and policy.
II. ANALYSIS
The Allied court's use of place of payment as the controlling prin-
ciple in its debt situs analysis conflicts with two important aspects of
the act of state doctrine: (1) the doctrine's intended purpose of
restricting the judiciary's role in matters of foreign affairs, and (2) the
flexible case-by-case approach advocated by the Supreme Court for
handling potential act of state situations. 139 Despite its flawed applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine, the court of appeals reached an appro-
priate resolution of the Costa Rican defaults. The Costa Rican
currency controls, unilaterally terminating a valid loan agreement,
violated both relevant international law and basic contract princi-
ples.14 Recognition of the currency controls as a legitimate act of
state would have set dangerous precedent and created a serious threat
to the stability of international finance.141
The Allied court's application of the act of state doctrine illus-
trates the doctrine's impropriety in the context of foreign loan
defaults. The courts should not allow the act of state doctrine to
threaten or disrupt the workings of those mechanisms and legal princi-
ples designed to resolve the growing international debt crisis. In short,
the act of state doctrine should not apply to foreign defaults.
136. Id. at 521.
137. Id. at 521-22.
138. Id. at 522.
139. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
140. Allied, 757 F.2d at 522.
141. See Government Brief, supra note 8.
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A. ALLIED'S DEBT SITUS ANALYSIS CONFLICTS WITH ACT OF
STATE PRINCIPLES
The Allied court's application of the act of state doctrine, which
relied on place of payment to determine act of state debt situs, con-
flicts with the doctrine's separation of powers rationale. 142 Ideally,
debt situs and the doctrine's territorial limitation should work
together to preclude judicial examination of acts effective within a sov-
ereign's territory and acts that the sovereign had a reasonable expecta-
tion of being effective within its territory.' 43 By precluding judicial
review of such acts, debt situs, as an integral part of the territorial
limitation, prevents U.S. courts from offending foreign nations and
interfering with executive foreign policy. 144 Simply put, debt situs
should prevent the courts from intruding into matters of foreign
affairs. Debt situs should ultimately confine the courts to their proper
role in the area of international relations. 145 As indicated, Sabbatino
narrowly circumscribes this role' 46 in the absence of clearly delineated
and readily applicable principles of international law.147
Unfortunately, the Allied court's place of payment test does not
accurately measure either the effectiveness of a sovereign's actions 148
or reasonableness of a sovereign's expectations of dominion over the
debt. 149 Place of payment thus fails to provide the necessary guidance
to prevent courts from offending the foreign sovereign whose acts are
at issue. To summarize, place of payment cannot properly determine
act of state debt situs. Place of payment fails to appropriately locate
debt situs because its narrow focus precludes consideration of many
factors having a practical bearing on the issues of effectiveness and
reasonableness of the expected dominion over the debt.' 50 For exam-
ple, a creditor, debtor, and the assets necessary to pay a debt could all
be present within a sovereign's territory, yet a court could deny the
effectiveness of a sovereign's purported taking of the debt if the loan
agreement specified a place of payment outside the sovereign's terri-
tory. Reliance on place of payment, therefore, may lead a court to
erroneously conclude that a foreign sovereign's actions are ineffective
within its territory even though common sense dictates otherwise.
142. See supra notes 5-6, 102-07 and accompanying text.
143. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
144. Id.
145. Id.; see supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 5-6.
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The court's subsequent refusal to apply the act of state doctrine would
therefore be incorrect.
The Allied decision further illustrates how reliance on place of
payment may lead to inaccurate estimates of the effectiveness of a sov-
ereign's actions. The court of appeals stated that the Costa Rican cur-
rency controls, which purported to "take" the debt owed Allied, did
not "come to complete fruition" within Costa Rica.151 The court rea-
soned that the currency controls could not constitute an effective tak-
ing within Costa Rican territory because the property they purported
to affect was located outside Costa Rica and in New York. 152
Assuming that place of payment correctly locates debt situs, the
court's analysis makes perfect sense. The currency controls cannot be
effective within Costa Rica if the object they purport to affect is in
New York. From a practical standpoint, though, the court's analysis
is far from perfect. The finding of the court that Costa Rica's pur-
ported taking did not come to "complete fruition" within Costa Rica
glosses over the crucial fact that Costa Rica had withdrawn all of its
New York assets ($2.5 million) prior to the rehearing.1 53 With noth-
ing to attach, the court of appeals gave Allied an empty victory. The
court may have considered the currency controls ineffective, but from
Allied's perspective the currency controls most effectively appropri-
ated the Costa Rican debt.
The Allied court concluded its opinion by noting that the Costa
Rican banks' "inability to pay United States dollars relates only to the
potential enforceability of the judgment; it does not determine whether
judgment should enter."154 Such a statement, however, overlooks the
obvious. When the Costa Rican banks cannot pay Allied and the
court cannot attach any assets to grant practical relief, judgment
should not enter because the Costa Rican government has engaged in
an effective act of state. Judicial review of Costa Rica's actions would
serve no purpose except to offend Costa Rica and involve the court in
foreign affairs.
In misjudging the effectiveness of a sovereign's actions, place-of-
payment analysis thus undermines the act of state doctrine's separa-
tion of powers rationale. It also conflicts with the flexibility of deci-
sion-making the Supreme Court believed necessary to the application
of the act of state doctrine.155 In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court
151. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.
1985).
152. Id.
153. See Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
154. Allied, 757 F.2d at 522.
155. See supra notes 6, 75-81, and accompanying text.
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expressly refused to formulate the act of state doctrine as a clear cut
rule of decision.156 The Court recognized that proper application of
the doctrine would require a careful weighing of a multiplicity of fac-
tors. 157 In contrast, the Allied court's application of the act of state
doctrine relied solely upon place of payment.'5 8 The Allied court's
simplistic formula cannot be substituted for the careful analysis and
balancing of competing interests that comprise the heart of the act of
state doctrine.159
The Allied court did consider, however, factors other than place
of payment in its "ordinary debt situs analysis.' 160 A careful reading
of the court's opinion indicates that the court clearly distinguished this
analysis from its act of state debt situs analysis.' 61 Nowhere does the
court imply that any factor other than place of payment determined
act of state debt situs. 162 In fact, the court deliberately mentioned that
"the concept of the situs of debt for act of state purposes differs from
the ordinary concept."' 163
Even assuming the court's ordinary debt situs analysis supple-
mented its act of state debt situs analysis, it is questionable whether
the factors stressed would be any more accurate in measuring the
effectiveness of a sovereign's actions than place of payment. To illus-
trate, the court emphasized the interest of the United States "in main-
taining New York's status as one of the foremost commercial centers
of the world."' 164 The court further emphasized that "[t]he United
States has an interest in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in
the United States in United States dollars under contracts subject to
the jurisdiction of United States courts may assume ... their rights
will be determined in accordance with recognized principles of con-
156. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1963).
157. Id.
158. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.
1985).
159. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 884
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Referring to the debt situs tests set forth in Harris v. Balk and Republic
of Iraq, the court states:
Yet, the tests fashioned to determine the situs of a debt are rigid and mechanical
and can be difficult to apply. More importantly, this inflexible approach, focusing
on a somewhat formalistic analysis of the situs of the debt, may not be an accurate
measure of the foreign state's reasonable expectations which appears to be the root
notion underlying the regulatory purpose of the territorial limitation to the act of
state doctrine. This court believes, therefore, that the inapplicability of the act of
state doctrine is more clearly seen when the principle of objective reasonableness
underlying the territorial limitation is applied directly to the facts of this case.
Id.
160. Allied, 757 F.2d at 521.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 516.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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tract law." 165 Although these interests form a compelling justification
for denying effect to the Costa Rican currency controls, they do not
necessarily determine the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
currency controls within Costa Rica.
B. ALLIED REACHED AN APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF THE
COSTA RICAN DEFAULTS
Despite the flaws in Allied's application of the act of state doc-
trine, the court nevertheless reached the most correct resolution of the
Costa Rican defaults.1 66 Had the court recognized the currency con-
trols as a legitimate act of state defense to the loan defaults, the court
would have set dangerous precedent and created a serious threat to the
stability of international finance. 167
In its amicus brief, the United States indicates the magnitude of
the issues posed by the Allied litigation: "The United States has a
strong interest in the decision in this case, which involves the legal
framework applicable to the payment of billions of dollars of loans
contracted by foreign governments and foreign private parties for
which New York is the place of payment under the contract."'' 68 The
legal framework the government refers to consists primarily of those
mechanisms of debt resolution developed by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF).169 The smooth operation of international finance
depends in large measure on the operation of these mechanisms.170 By
unilaterally terminating the valid loan agreement, the Costa Rican
government violated the IMF's debt resolution structure. In addition,
Costa Rica's actions ran directly counter to the cooperative effort
espoused by the IMF as necessary to debt restructuring.' 7'
165. Id. at 521-22.
166. The court of appeals decision to deny the Costa Rican currency controls effect was
correct from the perspective of international financiers. Judicial recognition of the cur-
rency controls as a legitimate act of state would have jeopardized the existing legal frame-
work for resolution of international debt problems. See infra note 181 and accompanying
text.
167. See Government Brief, supra note 8, at 6-7.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id at 7 n.2.
The system, as we know it today, has been in place for close to 40 years. Coun-
tries, confronted with the self-defeating competitive trade and monetary policies of
the 1930's established a number of international institutions in the 1940's to pro-
mote cooperation in governmental policies to facilitate world trade, investment,
and finance. In particular, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), through
which countries can coordinate and collaborate in the solution of international
monetary problems, has facilitated resolution of countries external financing
problems, under internationally agreed rules, since its establishment in 1945.
Id.
170. Id. at 6-7.
171. Id. at 4-12.
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The IMF framework was promulgated as a means to combat a
mounting international debt crisis: "In recent years, a substantial
number of countries-including Costa Rica-have faced serious exter-
nal payment difficuties, threatening the international financial and
trading systems as a whole." 172 According to the Managing Director
of the IMF:
Not only were the problems facing some debtor countries severe but their pros-
pects for tackling those problems in an orderly way were clouded by the deep
recession in the world economy .... It was crucial that the problems be tack-
led quickly, in a cooperative manner, and in a way that was consistent with the
preservation of the liberal trade and payments system.17 3
The Director stressed the need for a coordinated response to interna-
tional debt problems: "[A] growing realization developed that any
workable solution necessitated broad support and that it was in the
vital interest of all parties to cooperate.., all parties would lose-and
lose heavily-in the event of. . . proliferation of trade and payment
restrictions .... ",174
The international financial community's interdependence necessi-
tated a cooperative strategy. The IMF's strategy involved three ele-
ments: "[S]trong adjustment efforts by debtor countries, supportive
and cooperative action on the part of the international financiers, and
a revitalization of world trade to be achieved by a strengthening of
policies by the industrial countries."' 175 The implementation of this
strategy resulted in economic adjustment programs for debtor nations,
which the IMF currently approves and supervises.176 In response to
the debt crisis, the IMF thus developed a process for the resolution of
international economic problems: "It is a process that adequately bal-
ances the interests of creditors and debtors, public and private .... ,,177
The Costa Rican currency controls ran counter to the IMF's sys-
tem of voluntary cooperation. The controls unilaterally suspended
external payments on debts expressly made payable in the United
States. Judicial recognition of these controls as inviolate acts of state
172. Id. at 7-8 n.3.
173. Id. at 8 (citing J. de Larosiere, Remarks before the Institute of Foreign Bankers,
(May 2, 1984), reprinted in 13 IMF Survey 145, 146 (May 21, 1984)).
174. Id. at 8 n.4.
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id.
This approach has in fact worked well. As of June, 1984, 34 countries had current
economic adjustment programs with the IMF. J. de Larosiere, Remarks before the
International Monetary Conference, (June 4, 1984), reprinted in 13 IMF Survey
178 (June 18, 1984). Rescheduling of official and commercial debt was arranged for
a large number of countries. In 1983 alone some 30 countries, including 11 of the
25 largest borrowers, completed or were engaged in debt rescheduling with official
or commercial creditors ....
Id. at 9 n.5.
177. Id. at 11.
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would have jeopardized the IMF's international debt refinancing pro-
gram. The Allied court's allowance of the unilateral termination of
debt obligations would have established an easier, preferable alterna-
tive to the IMF's cooperative process. Preservation of that process
required that the court not recognize the Costa Rican controls as acts
of state.
C. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE
From the perspective of international financiers, the Second Cir-
cuit correctly refused to apply the act of state doctrine to the Costa
Rican currency controls. 178 Nonetheless, the court of appeals pre-
mised its decision on a faulty act of state analysis.1 79 The court thus
arrived at a proper result through an inadequate application of the act
of state doctrine.
Regrettably, the court's flawed application of the act of state doc-
trine places a desirable result on shaky ground. This unstable situa-
tion requires a remedy. The vital importance of Allied's subject matter
(i.e., the continuing integrity of the IMF debt resolution framework
and, more generally, the continuing stability of international contrac-
tual relations)180 necessitates a more substantial basis for the court's
decision.
One approach for achieving the Allied result without relying on
the court's place-of-payment debt situs analysis would involve a judi-
cial recognition that the act of state doctrine's limited range of applica-
bility does not extend to foreign defaults on United States bank
loans.181 Specifically, the courts should tailor a precise commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine specifically for instances of for-
eign defaults.
A correct application of the act of state doctrine would have cre-
ated a serious dilemma for the Allied court. Adherence to the Sabba-
tino blueprint for separation of powers would have forced the court to
conclude that the Costa Rican currency controls were legitimate acts
of state.182 Under a "common sense view," Costa Rica's actions were
178. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
180. See generally Government Brief, supra note 8.
181. See Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 123, at 34-35. With regard to the district court's
decision in Allied, counsel for the plaintiff writes:
The District Court, however, mistakenly assumed that simply because a state had
acted it faced an act of state question .... The perverse effect of such a reading is
to extend the act of state doctrine beyond its limited role by using it as an excuse
for selecting a law that was never applicable in the first place.
Id.
182. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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effective within its territory and therefore non-reviewable.18 3 Yet
strict adherence to the principle that the judiciary must apply suffi-
ciently codified international law would have compelled the court to
defer to the IMF debt resolving process.18 4 Faced with an "effective
taking," Sabbatino thus presented two possible courses of action. The
court could have compromised international finance through an
adherence to the act of state doctrine's separation of powers ration-
ale.18 5 Alternatively, the court could have assisted the operation of
international finance through an application of relevant international
law and deference to the IMF. 186 The act of state doctrine's failure to
provide a single coherent result indicates that the doctrine should not
apply in the context of foreign defaults.
Rather than apply the act of state doctrine to situations involving
foreign defaults, courts should recognize a "commercial exception"
specific to foreign defaults. 8 7 Under such an exception, a court could
safely refuse to apply act of state doctrine to restrictive currency con-
trols. The consequent strengthening of international finance would
more than justify any potential offense the defaulting nation might suf-
fer. Moreover, a commercial exception unique to foreign defaults
would have the added benefit of a coordinated operation of the act of
state doctrine and FSIA. 88
CONCLUSION
The Allied court's reliance on place of payment in its act of state
doctrine analysis does not square with the doctrine's fundamental
precepts. The court's use of place-of-payment analysis conflicts with
both the doctrine's separation of powers rationale and the flexibility of
decision-making advocated by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino.
Rather than attempt similar future applications of the act of state doc-
trine, the Second Circuit should consider the impropriety of the act of
state doctrine in the context of international finance. The act of state
doctrine should not disrupt the workings of those mechanisms
designed to effectively resolve international debt problems.
James M. Wall
183. Id.
184. For a good description of the international law relevant to the Allied litigation, see
Santucci, Sovereign Debt Resolution Through the International Monetary Fund: An Alter-
native to the Allied Bank Litigation, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1985).
185. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
186. See Santucci, supra note 184.
187. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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